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Abstract. Roles are usually seen as a descriptive concept that agents
adopt so showing expectation on its future interacting behaviour. These
expectations, so called standards, may be used to articulate contracts
among partners in environments dealing with uncertainty. However, few
work has been done in the field of multi-agent systems addressing the
evolving nature of roles, especially in open systems, in which changes
in the population should bring about changes in the way expectations
are assessed. In this paper, we put forward a mechanism to search for
appropriate incentives aiming to keep agents fulfilling the expectations
generated by the roles they play. Furthermore, we also present role evo-
lution policies that allow the system to re-arrange role players when in-
centives are not effective. We present some empirical results supporting
our approach.
1 Introduction
In open multi-agent systems, heterogeneous agents may enter and leave at will
and exhibit self-interested behaviours while interacting with others. Commit-
ments, as a means to make interactions more predictable, may be jeopardized
by the dynamic nature of the environment: when facing new circumstances, if
agents are not sufficiently socially concerned, they may value their private goals
more highly than the commitments they previously established.
In general, in open systems we cannot ensure that participants will behave
consistently over time either because of their ability or willingness. The primary
objective for agents to operate in such environments is to achieve their design
objectives and goals. In some cases, an agent may not be capable of maintaining
a certain standard of behaviour throughout its lifetime. In other cases, an agent
may deviate from its previous and typical behaviour either intentionally, or be-
cause its objectives and goals have changed, and hence, this needs to be reflected
in the actions taken or in extreme cases because of underlying errors in its pro-
gram. Therefore in the context of open environments, it is important to take
into account the evolution of an agent’s internal goals, motivations and prefer-
ences and even skills and abilities, in addition to the dynamics of the interaction
environment as a whole.
We adopt the notion of role given by Hermoso et al. in [4]: roles are described
as expectations over a set of tasks. In the same work, a role evolution mechanism
is presented to enhance partner selection for task delegation purposes. That
approach is based on examining the agent society and identifying “run-time
roles” – so building a role taxonomy – that cluster agents with similar skill
patterns for a certain (set of) task(s). From this perspective, a mechanism allows
identifying the role that labels the agents most suitable to perform a specific task.
In previous work [5], we have proposed a model to transform these run-
time roles into standards that agents may commit to. Given the evolving nature
of open environments and inherent uncertainty in agent behaviour as pointed
out above, the problem faced by the organization in which agents have been
(artificially) embedded is that of accurateness: this translates to the need to
assess whether agents originally designated as capable of enacting certain roles
are still up to the challenge. If they are not, one may choose to reorganize and
assign new roles to them according to their up-to-date performance. If, however,
this reorganization involves a non-trivial cost, another potentially less costly
approach is to influence the agents’ decision making through incentives in an
attempt to keep them on track. The goal of this paper is to explore these two
approaches when addressing the problem of role maintenance.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some pre-
liminary definitions in which our model is based, namely roles and standards.
Section 3 explains the decision making of agents that are seen as playing roles
identified by the system and introduces the notion of incentive schedule. Section 4
proposes two different policies to maintain roles. An incentive-based policy im-
plementing a local search procedure tries to find which incentive schedules should
be applied in order to maintain role quality. Reorganization is imposed when in-
centives are not cost-effective. We present some empirical results in Section 5.
The paper closes with the conclusions in Section 6.
2 Background
The rationale behind creating and maintaining performance standards relies on
the concept of role proposed by Hermoso et al. [4]. In this work, the authors claim
that in a society of agents, social relationships may evolve, so roles – defining
the positions of agents in terms of skills and importance as perceived by others –
should also do. A society of agents may be covered by an overlay role taxonomy
formed by extracting capacities and trust relationships among agents over time.
In particular, the authors show an approach for a coordination mechanism for
Task-oriented MAS (T-MAS) in which agents may interact with others by dele-
gating certain tasks. The authors assume that agents participating in the system
are rational, that is, they behave as utility maximisers. Thus, the main task of
the mechanism is twofold: i) to capture similar behaviour among participants
that play a role; and ii) to manage the role taxonomy that structures different
positions of agents in the system. The mechanism uses a K-Means clustering
algorithm to identify patterns of behaviour, so distinguishing those agents out-
performing others and, consequently, being more trusted by the participants.
This mechanism has been exhaustively tested in different conditions.
This paper addresses the problem of how to maintain the agents’ performance
on the level of quality determined by the roles they are playing. In order to take
this step, we need to move from roles as expectations of behaviour [10] to the
explicit handling of such expectations as conventions and further as norms [2]
that can be committed to. In other words, we need to transform information
about role specialisations into performance standards that agents could use to
estimate interaction outcomes. In order to do that, we adhere to the definition of
standard given in previous work [5]. Standards emerge from the notion of task
specialisation as an aggregate level of performance that agents playing a role
have shown to achieve in past interactions.
3 Dynamics
In this section, we introduce the decision making apparatus that agents use
when executing tasks. Our approach is based on the well known principal-agent
model [7, 1] from economics, in which a principal (a service requester) requests
an agent (the provider) to perform a specific task.
The outcome of the task execution affects the principal’s utility, who will
therefore be interested in influencing the effort that the agent puts in perform-
ing the task. The effort is expressed in terms of available actions which have
associated execution costs. In the so-called hidden action setting, it is assumed
that the actual actions as executed by the provider agent are unobservable to the
principal. Instead, only some performance measures of such actions are observed.
Actions determine, usually stochastically, the ensuing performance. Performance
is therefore a random variable whose probability distribution depends on the ac-
tions taken by the agent. This stochastic nature captures the fact that there are
externalities in the environment that the agent does not control. The principal
will therefore want to establish an incentive schedule in order to encourage the
provider agent to choose the actions that are more likely to lead to an intended
performance standard.
3.1 Targeting standards
As described in previous work [5], standards are generated through the use of
an averaging function applied to task execution outcomes of a group of provider
agents that have been clustered within a specific role.
Since, according to our model, standards allow requesters to identify ex-
pected values for the outcomes of tasks when executed by a specific provider,
we consider a standard as a target that agents should meet. Any deviation from
the standard is considered as a sub-optimal outcome. Figure 1 illustrates this
notion, where ς represents the target standard that the requester would expect,
and each concentric circle labelled with a δi denotes equidistant performances to
the target. Concentric lines highlight the fact that we shall consider deviations
Fig. 1. A standard as a target
in any direction to be equally harmful in terms of expected values. The arrow
pointing towards the centre discloses the aim of our incentive-based approach
with which we will try to encourage providers to better conform to the standard.
3.2 Actions and outcomes
In our model, we will assume that each provider has a set of actions at its
disposal, each with a cost and a probability function for obtaining different
performance outcomes. Actions can be thought of as the effort the provider
puts in when executing a given task: employing more effort, will more likely
lead to a higher outcome. Of course, expending more effort also means bearing
a higher cost. Following a finite model for actions and outcomes we have that:
Definition 1 The provider has an ordered set of possible actions A = {a1, ..., an},
where ai ≺ aj if i < j. This means that Cost(ai) < Cost(aj), i.e., ai is less costly
for the provider to execute than aj.
Definition 2 The possible observable outcomes that the provider may obtain is
an ordered set X¯ = {x¯1, ..., x¯m}, where x¯i ≺ x¯j if i < j (x¯i is a worse outcome
than x¯j and therefore indicates worse performance).
Definition 3 There is a probability distribution function for X¯ given an ac-
tion in A, where p(x¯k|ai) is the probability of obtaining outcome x¯k ∈ X¯ when
performing action ai ∈ A. We have that
∑m
k=1 p(x¯k|ai) = 1, for all i ∈ [1, n].
We assume that the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) [1], relating
actions with outcomes (as defined in Def. 4), holds for every provider. This prop-
erty indicates that greater efforts are more likely to produce better outcomes.
Definition 4 The MLRP holds iff for any ai, aj ∈ A with ai ≺ aj we have that
the likelihood ratio p(x¯k|ai)/p(x¯k|aj) is non-increasing in k.
3.3 Incentives
Given the fact that only outcomes, and not efforts, are observable by the prin-
cipal, incentives are specified through an incentive schedule mapping possible
outcomes to incentive values to be collected or paid by the provider (Def. 5).
Definition 5 An incentive schedule I : X¯ → I maps each possible outcome in
X¯ to a specific incentive value in I.
We look at incentives as producing some change in the utility that the agent
would get if no incentives were in place. In this sense, D(I) = [−1, 1], where
positive values denote percentage increases in utility and negative values denote
percentage decreases in utility (i.e., they are seen as penalties). A null value
means that there is no incentive in place.
3.4 Providers’ decision rationale
Based on the stochastic model of action outcomes explained above, each provider
is assumed to be an expected utility maximizer agent. Therefore, when choosing
the action a to perform it will seek to maximize expected utility [9]:
arg max
a∈A
Ea =
m∑
i=1
p(x¯i|a)u(x¯i, I(x¯i))− Cost(a) (1)
where u(x¯i, I(x¯i)) is the utility the agent gets from obtaining performance out-
come x¯i, taking into account the incentive I(x¯i) it will get from such a perfor-
mance. Utility is therefore defined as follows:
u(x¯i, I(x¯)) = u(x¯i)× (1 + sens(I(x¯))) (2)
This function encompasses two sub-functions: the prior utility u(x¯i) collected
according to the outcome obtained, and the effect on this utility of the incentive
value applied (prior utility remains unchanged when the agent is immune to
incentives: sens(I(x¯)) = 0). In order to accommodate different sensitivities,
sens : I(x¯)→ [0, 1] is modelled as follows, where B ∈ N+:
sens(I(x¯)) =
1
1 + e−I(x¯).B
(3)
Higher B values make the agent more sensitive to incentives, while with lower
ones the agent will tend to behave the same regardless of any incentives.
4 Policies
As pointed out in Section 2, each provider is assigned to a role according to the
performance that it exhibits. Given the evolving nature of the environment in
which the agent operates, it may be the case that the agent alters its perfor-
mance, for better or for worse. We should emphasize at this point that, since
the agent is an expected utility maximizer, its decision regarding how much ef-
fort to employ is conditioned by a number of factors which we can identify by
analysing Equation 1. Any changes in these factors are thus possible causes for
a deviation from the standard characterizing the agent’s assigned role: i) costs
of the efforts that the agent has at its disposal; ii) effectiveness of efforts, that is,
their probability distributions over performance outcomes; iii) utility the agent
gets from obtaining each possible outcome; and iv) sensitivity of the agent with
respect to any incentives it may be offered. In this paper, we assume the agent
somehow becomes aware of changes in these factors in order to take them into
account when deciding which action to perform.
These deviations in performance render the role clustering unfit to represent
the current performances of agents in the system, in terms of the standards
extracted from the roles. Therefore, in order to maintain role stability when
agents deviate from agreed standards, the system may determine and employ
an appropriate incentive schedule I : X¯ → I (see Def. 5). Since actions are
not observable, this schedule is based exclusively on the measurable outcomes of
task execution, which for the sake of defining appropriate incentive schedules are
compared with the target outcomes characterizing the roles. We call the entity
responsible for maintaining role stability an incentive policy maker (IPM). The
IPM does not have access to the factors influencing the agents’ decision making
as this is considered to be private information.
The goal of the IPM is to keep on target the agents playing a specific role,
i.e., agents should obtain outcomes as close as possible to the target outcome of
the role. We assume the IPM prefers to achieve this aim with the least incentives
needed. In case of failure to accomplish this aim, or if by doing so the IPM has
to apply a too costly incentive schedule, then it is time to rearrange the role –
agents are seen as no longer being able to perform the role at a bearable cost
for the system and should thus be reassigned to a different role.
4.1 Incentive schedules
Given an incentive schedule offered to the agents playing a specific role, we may
determine its effectiveness by looking at the outcomes that have been obtained.
We should also take into account the cost of applying such an incentive schedule.
Given the stochastic nature of agent efforts in terms of obtained outcomes, an
incentive schedule’s quality oscillates around some value, regardless of there be-
ing any changes in the environment that lead agents to deviate from previously
obtained outcomes. In order to compute an incentive schedule’s quality Q(I),
we aggregate a sequence X¯ = 〈x¯1, x¯2, . . . , x¯n〉 of n obtained outcomes (x¯i ∈ X¯ ),
and compare them with the target outcome x¯. We define Q(I) as:
Q(I) =
(
wo × targetHit(X¯)− wc × totalCost(I, X¯)
)
/(wo × n) (4)
targetHit(X¯) = n−
n∑
i=1
|x¯i − x¯| (5)
totalCost(I, X¯) =
n∑
i=1
|I(x¯i)| (6)
Target hit measures the incentive schedule’s effectiveness in inducing agents to
meet the target. Any values outside the target are seen as deviations that need to
be minimized in terms of role maintenance – for simplicity we assume X¯ ⊂ [0, 1].
A perfect performance consists of n outcome values at the target x¯. The total
cost of the incentive schedule takes into account actually paid incentives, which
depend on the outcomes obtained. In order to normalize Q(I) to the range
[0, 1], the weighted sum of these two components is divided over the maximum
quality value, where all n outcomes are on target and no incentive values are
applied. Weights wo and wc allow us to define the relative importance of these
two conflicting goals, e.g., by giving priority to obtained performance over how
much it costs to achieve it in terms of incentives paid.
In the quest to find out the best incentive schedule, measured both in terms
of effectiveness and cost, the number of different incentive schedules available
to the IPM is quite high. In order to reduce this search space, we can limit
ourselves to incentive schedules composed of values within the set bI · 10c /10,
which gives us discrete incentive values with 0.1 steps. Depending on the number
of outcomes to consider, this may still give us a huge number of schedules to
experiment with. We can slightly alleviate this issue by taking into account the
intuitive heuristic that we should promote outcomes closer to the target no less
than outcomes farther away.
4.2 A local search approach
Given the high number of schedules to experiment with, we follow a local search
approach to find the optimal incentive schedule. More specifically, we employ a
hill-climbing procedure, by successively trying to find out neighbouring incentive
schedules that are better than the currently employed one. In order to find them,
however, we need to try out incentive schedules before we know how worthy they
are, which makes the search more stochastic. Furthermore, given the dynamics
of the environment, these quality values are not constant over time, and thus
exploration must always be an option.
To generate the neighbours of an incentive schedule, we introduce a step
change (upwards or downwards) on the incentive value being applied to the
target outcome. If the change is downwards, we correct the schedule obtained so
that outcomes closer to the target have at least the same incentive as outcomes
farther away. This gives us a cardinality of at most 2 in the set of neighbours of
each possible schedule.
The local search procedure is illustrated in Algorithm 1. At each step, we
compare the current schedule with the best known (line 4), and update it (line 5).
Whenever the current schedule is not better than the best known (which means
we have tried a neighbour that was not found to be better), we go back to the
best as the current schedule (line 7). Then we randomly explore, with probability
1−Q(best), the neighbours of the best schedule (line 9) – the better the schedule
is, the less likely we will explore, exploiting instead the best schedule we know
of. In order to compute the quality of each incentive schedule we need to apply
it enough time to aggregate new evidence to fill in sequence X¯ (see Eq. 6).
Algorithm 1 Local search for incentive schedules
1: best {the best known incentive schedule}
2: current {the currently applied incentive schedule}
3: loop
4: if Q(current) > Q(best) then
5: best← current
6: else
7: current← best
8: end if
9: with probability 1−Q(best): current← RandomNeighbour(best)
10: end loop
4.3 Re-organization
Given the organizational flavour of role taxonomies, we have preferred an incentive-
based policy to a reorganization of the system in terms of up-to-date skills of
agents. This preference is due to both practical and fundamental reasons. The
computational complexity of creating or updating a role-taxonomy may be con-
siderable, especially when little is known about the agents that are to take part
in this organization, and thus about the roles that are to be created (see e.g. the
clustering approach in [4]). Furthermore, the very notion of roles as a descrip-
tive facet of an organization presumes some notion of stability as they provide
a means to identify specific agents within the organization. If we reorganize too
often, this property of long-term existence is lost.
Nevertheless, there will be situations in which reorganization is a better op-
tion as compared to applying incentive schedules with the aim of influencing the
providers’ behaviour. On the one hand, although an effective incentive schedule
may be found, applying it may bear a significant cost. On the other, there will
be situations in which an effective incentive schedule is not found. This may
happen either because the search procedure employed is not able to find it (the
local search approach described in the previous section is vulnerable to local
optima), or because environmental changes have reduced the influencing ability
of the IPM, therefore lowering the effectiveness of the most effective incentive
schedule available. In either case, the quality Q(I) of the best incentive schedule
found will be lower than a certain value. We may use this information to decide
when to reorganize the role taxonomy. By reorganizing we mean to obtain roles
that exhibit a higher cohesion in terms of the skills of the agents to which those
roles have been assigned.
Given the permanent search for better incentive schedules (see Algorithm 1),
the stochastic nature of outcomes, and possible environmental changes, Q(I)
may oscillate. Therefore, in order to infer that the incentive-based policy is
not able to obtain incentive schedules that are cost-effective we must allocate
enough time for the search procedure to run. The approach that we take to make
such a call is to collect nq quality values
〈
q1, q2, . . . qnq
〉
for the last nq employed
incentive schedules, and to compare the average of those values with a predefined
threshold qmin ∈ [0, 1]. Reorganization is the choice if
(∑nq
i=1 qi
)
/nq < qmin.
By increasing the value of parameter qmin, we demand more cost-effective in-
centive schedules before a reorganization decision is taken. Lower qmin values will
allow for less cost-effective schedules, meaning that we consider reorganization
as being a more costly operation to undertake.
5 Evaluation
The software we have used to empirically evaluate our approach is a simula-
tion framework built using RePast Simphony. We have designed experiments
to present how our proposal learns appropriate incentives for different types of
providers along time and, in case the search for incentive schedules fails, how
the role evolution mechanism can be launched to re-allocate providers in roles
more representative of their current skills.
5.1 Provider profiling
There are three functions that together determine the behaviour of each provider.
Firstly, we define a function for effort costs, as mentioned in Def. 1; these costs
are used in the provider’s decision making (see Equation 1). For this purpose, we
use Equation 7 to define different profiles of providers. This means that different
providers may have different costs for the same efforts.
Cost(a) = α · (k + (1− k) · a1/β) (7)
We model five provider profiles, whose effort cost functions are depicted in
Figure 2. Due to length constraints we only use some of them in the experiments.
– Flat. The provider’s efforts cost is the same for any effort (α = 0.5, k = 1
and β = 1).
– Linear. Effort costs increase linearly. We set α = 1, k = 0 and β = 1.
– Concave. Effort costs are modelled with a concave-shaped function. We use
α = 1, β = 0.3 and k = 0. We do not use it.
– Convex. Effort costs are modelled with a convex-shaped function. We use
α = 1, β = 3 and k = 0.
– Random. Values for α, k and β are randomly selected with 0.5 ≤ α ≤ 1,
0.3 ≤ β ≤ 3 and 0 ≤ k ≤ 0.5.
We use the same approach to define the second function: the outcome utility
of the providers, that is, the utility the provider obtains from each possible
outcome (this is the prior utility u(x¯i) mentioned in Equation 2). The same
profiles defined above are applied to this function.
The third function we need to put forward is the one relating provider efforts
and obtained outcomes, as mentioned in Def. 3 and used in Equation 1. We have
modelled this relation by using beta distributions, whose shape is controlled by
two parameters, α and β. For each beta distribution, we set α = 1 + (c ∗ p− c)
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Fig. 2. Effort-Cost and Outcome-Utility provider profiles
and β = p− (c ∗ p− c), where c is a centre value and p is a peak factor that we
have set picking a random value between 50 and 70.
To be more specific, we consider as possible outcomes the set {x¯1, x¯2, . . . , x¯7}.
For simplicity, the cardinality of efforts available to providers is the same (al-
though it need not be): a1, a2, . . . , a7. We generate the outcome probability ob-
tained by each effort ai as a beta distribution with centres selected in a non-
decreasing fashion from {x¯1, . . . , x¯7}, so ensuring that the MLRP property holds.
5.2 Empirical evaluation
We assume at the beginning of each experiment that the role evolution mech-
anism was run and providers have been allocated in one out of seven possible
roles, each targeting a different outcome. Thus, we will have a population with
providers allocated in the role they perform better (that is, corresponding to the
outcome they most often obtain).
As the goal of this section is to give some evidence on the potential of the
approach, we have divided the experiments into three different scenarios. The
first two are meant to test the well functioning of the mechanism of incentive
search detailed in Section 4.2, with different provider profiles in the population.
The third scenario has to do with the need for reorganization in some cases.
Besides we use two different search approaches: individual search, in which we
learn incentive schedules for each provider separately; and role search, in which
we learn incentive schedules for all the providers in the same role.
After a few empirical tests, we set the value of B to 10, in order to tune the
sensitivity of providers to incentives (see Eq. 3). Moreover, also after empirical
consideration, in order to evaluate the quality of the incentive schedules found
we set wo = 2 and wc = 1, so giving priority to obtained performance over the
cost of its application, in terms of incentives paid. The population size is 100
providers and we simulate task executions for every different provider in every
time step. We show average results from different runs.
In the first scenario, we initiate the population with providers all with a
Random profile, for both effort costs and outcome utility functions. We introduce
changes into the system at time step 100. These changes consist of modifying 25%
of the providers by randomising the parameters for effort outcome and outcome
utility functions. In Figure 3, we show the results of this experiment running the
mechanism with individual search, so seeking incentive schedules personalised for
each provider in order to make them perform as close as possible to the standard
created from the role they play.
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Fig. 3. Results for the random population changing 25% at time t = 100 to random
profile (individual search)
In Figure 3(a), we observe the average outcome of the providers in the seven
different roles. As expected, each provider starts fully attached to its role stan-
dard (thinner flat lines). Then, at t = 100 changes in the population make some
providers deviate from the standard. The local search (applied individually) is
able to incentivize the providers deviating from their standards with adequate
incentives. Note that for some roles, to incentivize providers with a proper in-
centive schedule takes longer due to the stochastic nature of the search.
Figure 3(b) shows how Q(I) evolves through time for the same experiment.
We can observe how in the first 100 ticks, incentives are mostly not used, since
there is no need for them (notice that until t = 100 providers behave as they
did when allocated in the role they play). We also observe a slight oscillation
around the optimum value. This is a consequence of the stochastic nature of effort
outcome distributions and the exploration of the local search method. After the
changes introduced at t = 100, the quality of incentive schedules temporarily
drops, while the system is striving to find better schedules eventually recovering
around t = 500. Although an increase on Q(I) is clearly observable for some
roles, the cost of applying the incentives prevents it from rising back to initial
values (before changes in the population were introduced).
The second scenario starts with a population of providers all with a Random
profile, for both effort costs and outcome utility functions. We then introduce
changes into the system at time step 100. These changes consist of modifying
all providers by randomising the parameters for effort outcome and outcome
utility functions. In Figure 4, we show the results of this experiment running the
mechanism using role search, so seeking distinct incentive schedules for different
roles to apply collectively to all providers playing each role, in order to make
them perform as close as possible to the standard the role defines.
In Figure 4(a), we can observe the results of this experiment. As in the pre-
vious experiment, providers start fully attached to their role’s standard (thinner
flat lines) at the beginning of the simulation. After the changes take effect we
note a deviation in the average outcomes for each role. From that moment on,
the local search starts to be effective in some of the roles. For instance, it barely
takes 80 time steps to get back role defined by outcome x¯7 close to the stan-
dard again. It takes longer to do the same with the role defined by outcome
x¯5 (about 500 time steps). These differences are due to the stochastic nature
of the mechanism, which can get trapped sometimes in local optima. Another
feature to remark is the inability of the mechanism to fix some of the providers
that clearly deviated from their required behaviour. This is the case for roles
defined by outcomes x¯1 and x¯2. In this case, the change in the parameters of the
effort costs and outcome utility functions has been significant, since providers
playing those roles are too heterogeneous with regard to the expected outcomes,
resulting in the absence of an appropriate incentive schedule suitable for them.
Actually, this is more likely to happen in those roles with a smaller number of
providers. In them, a change in the providers’ profile makes the role “behave”
in a totally different manner from what was expected when it was created. We
can notice this issue in Figure 4(b) in which we display the size, in terms of
providers, of every role in the system. Observing it we notice that low populated
roles for lower target outcomes (x¯1, x¯2) are more sensitive to changes, that is,
providers will very easily change outcomes with any changes in the effort-costs
and outcome-utility functions. In other words, it is more difficult to bring the
providers back to those expected outcomes (x¯1, x¯2).
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Fig. 4. Random population changing 100% at t = 100 to random profile (role search)
In order to address the inability to meet the standards in some roles through
an incentive-based approach, we described in Section 4.3 a policy to consider
if a re-allocation of providers is needed as a last resort of the system attempt-
ing to keep providers on track. We have implemented this policy with a threshold
qmin = 0.8, the minimum incentive schedule quality that prevents re-organisation.
If qmin is not met, a re-organisation of providers is carried out by re-allocating
providers from one role to another. Re-organisation is carried out only for those
roles that need it, not for the entire role taxonomy. The aim of the re-organisation
is to get rid of the problem of providers for whom incentives are useless.
With the aforementioned in mind we put forward a third experiment that
tries to verify our assumption on this. We start again with a population of
providers all with a Random profile. After 100 time steps we change all providers
to have a Convex profile (see Eq. 7). After that, in time step 700 another change
occurs, this time converting all agents into Linear providers. Moreover, we let
our mechanism search incentives for each role (role search), and we let the re-
organisation policy consider re-allocation of providers every 200 time steps. Re-
sults are shown in Figure 5.
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Fig. 5. Results for random population changing 100% at t = 100 and t = 700 to convex
and linear profiles, respectively (role search). Re-organisation running every 200 units
We can observe in Figure 5(a) how at the beginning providers keep their
behaviour according to their role. After the first change (t = 100), providers
start to deviate from the target outcome marked by the standard. We can see
how the local search method achieves to make providers behave according to
their roles in some cases (role for target outcome x¯5 and more slightly in roles
for target outcomes x¯4 and x¯7). When the first re-organisation takes place (t =
200), looking at Figure 5(b) we notice that there exist four roles (with target
outcomes for standards x¯1, x¯2, x¯3 and x¯4) for which incentives are being useless
(compared to qmin threshold). For that reason, the re-organisation policy decides
to re-allocate agents playing those roles. In the case of the first three of them
(x¯1, x¯2, x¯3), the policy removed the roles, re-allocating all the providers to other
roles according to their changed behaviour. In the case of role for x¯4, the policy
re-allocated some of the providers in other roles but some others remain (since
they still behave according to the expected behaviour for this role). After the
second change (t = 700), no changes are noticed in the providers, since the
effectiveness of the incentives for the convex population remains over time.
In these experiments we have tested two aspects. First, we have shown that
our mechanism is able to learn suitable incentive schedules to keep providers to
the standards emerged from roles. However, in some cases the method is not able
to achieve this because of the providers’ dynamics or due to the heterogeneity
of the roles. Then we have demonstrated that a re-organisation process is able
to re-allocate providers to roles according to their up-to-date skills.
6 Conclusions
In the last few years, a considerable number of research proposals have been
made concerning the development of infrastructures for supporting interaction
in open multi-agent systems. In this paper, we have built on one such proposal [4]
by extending it with the notion of standards, which characterize the roles that
agents are able to play. Such standards comprise the focus of two different policies
that intend to maximize role stability. Our proposal assumes that a discovered
role taxonomy is used to provide a service enabling other providers to find the
most suitable performers of specific tasks.
Incentive schedules can be thought of as patches that the system tries to
apply in the meantime, as an attempt to keep the current role structure. This
approach favours role stability, looking at roles as being part of an overall or-
ganization of the population. When such patches are not effective according to
some evaluation function, reorganizing the role taxonomy comprises the last re-
sort that the system has at its disposal, with the aim of providing a good agent
identification service. One could argue that the proposed incentive mechanism is
exploitable by providers once they notice that by intentionally under-performing
they are able to get access to incentives that would otherwise not be needed.
However, such providers are likely to lose in the long run, as soon as the system
decides on reorganizing the role taxonomy.
Other approaches to social control through incentives include the work by
Centeno et al. [3], who present an approach on adaptive sanction learning by
exploring and identifying individuals’ inherent preferences without explicit dis-
closure of information. The mechanism learns which attributes of the system
should be modified in order to induce agents to avoid undesired actions. In our
case, we adhere to a more formal scenario, in which interactions are regulated by
means of specific standards; we also assume that incentives are directly inflicted
on the agents. An approach based on sanctions is proposed by Lopes Cardoso
and Oliveira in [8], which also assumes that sanctions influencing agents’ be-
haviour are directly applied to them, namely by adjusting deterrence sanctions
applicable to contractual obligations agents have committed to. The notion of
social control employed there is similar to our notion of role standard mainte-
nance, although instead of run-time discovered standards, a fixed threshold is
used to guide the decisions of the policy maker. Moreover, only sanctions (seen
as fines) are employed to have a deterrence effect and discouraging agents from
misbehaving, while here we are more interested on incentivizing agents to meet
specific targets when executing specific tasks. In a preliminary approach [6], we
have put forward an incentive-based mechanism that uses reinforcement learn-
ing to find out incentive schedules that influence agents to meet specific targets
(much as we do in this paper). However, further assumptions were made in that
model, namely that the highest efforts would bring outcomes closer to target
values. In this paper, we change the focus of the incentive policy maker: that of
targeting the standard, regardless of the efforts that agents must employ. This
enables us to experiment with more heterogeneous populations, imposing thus
fewer assumptions on the agents’ decision models.
Possible applications that we identify for our approach include manufactur-
ing systems, in which agents fulfilling different roles when building a craft are
supposed to meet and maintain a standard during their work. Social systems
such as ruled electronic markets are another promising domain, in which, as
standards may not be known a priori, they can be discovered at runtime and
artificially maintained for the sake of the overall market community.
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